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Abstract 
This study tests whether individuals who grow up with parents on welfare benefits are 
themselves more (or less) likely to be welfare recipients as young adults, compared to 
individuals  who  grow  up  in  non-welfare  households.  We  use  the  sibling  difference 
method to identify causal effects separately from the effects of correlated factors. While 
a  descriptive  analysis  reveals  a  fairly  high  positive  intergenerational  correlation, 
especially in the late teens and conditional on a large set of household level factors, the 
sibling  analysis  provides  no  support  for  a  causal  effect  of  parents’  welfare  benefit 
receipt on children’s future welfare use. 
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1  Introduction 
Welfare benefit  policy is  an area that has  received considerable political  interest  in 
many countries during the last decades. Starting with the US welfare reform of 1996, 
several  countries  have  sought  to  reform  their  welfare  benefit  systems  to  decrease 
caseloads and increase employment. One motivation for these policies, in particular in 
the US, is the fear that having a large population on welfare may produce “welfare 
cultures”; i.e., a situation in which individuals are trapped in poverty and the use of 
welfare  spreads  through  social  interactions.  Such  interactions  may  occur  between 
individuals in various social networks, for example between parents and children. 
In this paper we focus on the long term effects of welfare use, and test whether the 
use of welfare benefits is transmitted from parents to their children. This is an important 
topic as it does not only reveal something about the mechanisms of welfare use, but it 
may also shed light on the potential long term effects of policies aimed at reducing 
welfare use. More precisely, this paper estimates the direct causal effects of growing up 
in a household that receives welfare benefits, using a sibling difference comparison on 
Swedish households during the 1990s.  
There are several ways in which parental welfare benefit receipt could affect the 
children’s welfare use as adults: i) children of welfare recipients may develop less of a 
natural connection to work life and have less access to work-related networks, which 
may  make  them  more  likely  to  receive  welfare  as  adults;  ii)  children  of  welfare 
recipients may learn how the welfare benefit system works, and how life on welfare is, 
which may make them either more or less likely to use welfare; and iii) children of 
welfare recipients may experience welfare receipt as more or less stigmatizing. The 
effects we consider are hence related to viewing the parents as role models, to attitudes 
to welfare benefits, and to access to employment-related networks through the parents. 
The challenge is to separate these effects of parental welfare use from other factors 
that are correlated with the welfare use of both parents and children. There are two types 
of such factors: i) the welfare receipt of parents may be correlated with other household 
level characteristics, which affect future welfare benefit receipt of children through the 
home  environment;  and  ii)  parents  and  children  may  be  similar  in  personal 
characteristics that affect their likelihood of receiving welfare benefits, such as attitudes 
to  or  skills  for  work.  Although  there  is  a  fairly  large  number  of  studies  on  
4   
intergenerational welfare transmission, especially studies based on US data, there is no 
clear evidence of whether the commonly observed positive intergenerational correlation 
in welfare benefit receipt reflects a causal effect of parental welfare benefits, or whether 
this correlation is the result of other factors.
 1  
Only a few of the previous studies have attempted to separately identify the causal 
effects.  Gottschalk  (1996)  attempts  to  capture  unobserved  heterogeneity  by  adding 
parental welfare benefit status measured when the child is an adult to the regression 
model. This approach will capture the effect of any similarities in the propensity to 
become a welfare benefit recipient, to the extent that they stay fixed over time and enter 
the model linearly. It does not, however, solve the problem of how to control for other 
factors – related to the home environment etc. – which are correlated with parental 
welfare benefits during childhood but are not fully captured by the parents’ current 
welfare receipt. 
Another approach is to instrument for parental welfare benefit receipt as the child 
grows up (see e.g., Pepper (2000), Siedler (2004), Maloney et al. (2003)). The idea here 
is to use only the variation in parental welfare benefit receipt that is exogenous – i.e., 
uncorrelated with other factors that affect children’s future welfare benefit receipt. The 
problem is to find instruments that have sufficiently strong effect on parents’ welfare 
benefit receipt as the child grows up but that have no direct effects on the child’s future 
welfare benefit receipt. Some of the instruments that were used in the previous studies 
are questionable from a methodological point of view. For example, Maloney et al. 
(2003) use parent’s educational and civil status as instruments, in spite of the fact that 
these may well have a direct effect on children’s future welfare benefit status. The more 
convincing  studies  (see  e.g.,  Pepper  (2000))  use  the  local  unemployment  rate  as 
instrument for parental welfare use. 
To the best of our knowledge, the only previous study on intergenerational welfare 
benefit  transmission  in  Sweden  is  Stenberg  (2000),  in  which  the  intergenerational 
correlations  for  a  sample  of  approximately  12,000  individuals  born  in  1952  are 
estimated.  The  study  includes  an  extensive  set  of  control  variables,  and  the  results 
suggest a positive correlation in the welfare benefit receipt of children and parents in 
households where other social problems are also present, such as behavioral problems in 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Antel (1992), Gottschalk (1990) and (1996), Pepper (2000), Siedler (2004), Maloney et al. 
(2003), and Stenberg (2000).  
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school or having a father with a criminal record, but not in households without such 
problems. 
The sibling-based approach that is used in this paper relies on using a difference-in-
difference (DID) estimator to control for the influence of omitted variables that are 
correlated with the welfare benefit receipt of both parents and children. The findings in 
Stenberg  (2000)  highlight  the  fact  that  family  level  factors,  which  are  often  not 
detectable to the researcher and are likely to be correlated with welfare benefit receipt, 
may be important to control for to isolate the causal effects of welfare. This makes the 
sibling difference analysis particularly appealing, because it in effect controls for all 
observed and unobserved family level characteristics that stay fixed over time. 
We have access  to  detailed register data on all Swedish  individuals  aged 16–64, 
including information on welfare benefit payments and family connections, and several 
socio-economic and demographic background variables. Using these rich data, we are 
able  to  construct  a  data  set  that  meets  our  requirements  for  the  sibling  difference 
analysis. Specifically, we extract a sample of two types of families with (at least) two 
children: i) in which the parents received no welfare benefits until the older sibling was 
24, but started to receive welfare benefits after that; and ii) in which the parents never 
received  welfare  benefits  until  both  siblings  had  turned  24.  This  sample  is  used  to 
estimate the effect of parental welfare benefit receipt on the likelihood that the child 
receives welfare at the age of 24.
2 
The fact that we use a DID -specification, means that we rely on variation between 
younger and older siblings, and between types of families, to identify the effect.  First, 
we take the difference in welfare benefit receipt at age 24 between the older and 
younger siblings, in families in which the younger but not the older sibling was exposed 
to parental welfare receipt before age 24. That is, we use only families in wh ich the 
parents started to receive welfare benefits after the older sibling had turned 25. Second, 
we subtract the corresponding between-sibling difference among the families where the 
parents  never  received  welfare.  The  appeal  of  this  specification  is  tha t  the  first 
difference controls for family level factors to the extent that they stay fixed over time 
and affect older and younger siblings in a similar manner, while the second difference 
controls for factors that are specific to the time period during wh ich we measure the 
                                                 
2 As will be discussed further in section 4.2, we hence use a specific sample of individuals for the analysis, and this 
affects the generalizability of the results.  
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outcome variable, as long as these factors have a similar effect on children from the two 
types of families. 
To this DID-specification, we add a set of time-varying covariates, and we add time 
trends interacted with a set of predetermined factors that are correlated with welfare 
benefit propensity. This helps control for household level and other factors that are not 
captured by the DID-specification. The estimation details will be further discussed in 
section 3. 
The sibling difference method has been used in several areas, such as returns to 
schooling  (Ashenfelter  &  Zimmerman  (1997))  and  intergenerational  effects  in 
unemployment (Ekhaugen (2005)). The study that is most closely related to this, Levine 
and  Zimmerman (2005), applies  the  sibling difference method to  test  the effects  of 
maternal  welfare  benefit  receipt  on  children’s  developmental  outcomes,  such  as 
educational  attainment.  Their  results  show  no  evidence  of  a  causal  link  between 
maternal welfare receipt and children’s outcomes. 
Our study is also related to the literature on intergenerational income mobility. The 
aggregate evidence from these studies suggests a positive correlation between parents’ 
and  children’s  income,  although  the  estimated  magnitudes  of  this  correlation  vary.
3 
Björklund & Jäntti (1997), for example, show that the income mobility seems to be 
larger  in  Sweden  than  in  the  US.  Other  studies  investigate  the  intergenerational 
transmission of poverty, such as Duncan et al. (1998) and Airio et al. (2005), and find 
that  the  risk  of  poverty  in  adulthood  is  larger  for  individuals  growing  up  in  poor 
families. 
The results of our analysis confirms a positive correlation between children’s and 
parents’ welfare benefit receipt in the data, even after we control for a large number of 
observable household level characteristics. However, our DID-based sibling analysis, 
which conditions on unobserved heterogeneity, yields no support for a causal effect of 
parental welfare benefit receipt on children’s future welfare benefit use. 
The organization of the remaining sections is as follows: section 2 describes the data 
used, section 3 presents and discusses the empirical model, and section 4 contains a 
descriptive  analysis.  Section  5  presents  and  discusses  the  results,  and  section  6 
concludes. 
                                                 
3 See e.g. Solon (1992), Corak & Heisz (1999), Chadwick & Solon (2002.  
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2  Data  
We are fortunate to have access to register data on incomes and demographic variables 
for all Swedes aged 16–64 from 1990–2007. The information on welfare benefits is in 
the form of the total yearly amount (in SEK currency) of welfare benefits received by 
the household.  The data also  contains  a number of socio-economic factors, such as 
disposable income, other types of benefits (sickness benefits, sickness pension benefits 
and benefits for disabled) and information on family characteristics and educational 
attainment.  Importantly,  we  are  able  to  link  parents  and  children  (biological  and 
adopted), and from age 16, we observe whether the children and parents live in the same 
household or whether the child has moved out.
 4 
We use these data to construct a data set consisting of all sibling pairs in which the 
siblings are born in 1973 and 1981, in 1974 and 1982, or in 1975 and 1983.
5 Therefore, 
there is an 8-year difference between the sibling pairs in our data. This is admittedly a 
long period, but it is necessary as we want to be able to measure the outcome variable – 
welfare benefit receipt as a  young adult  – of the older sibling before the start of a 
potential parental welfare benefit spell. 
We measure the children’s exposure to parental welfare when they are 17-19.
6 This 
means that we omit sibling pairs in which the parents received welfare when the older 
sibling was 17-19. This provides approximately 5000 families to use for the estimations. 
The outcome variable, children’s welfare use, is measured as the children are 24 years 
old. 
Figure 1 shows the aggregate unemployment and welfare benefit rates in 1980–2006 
(with welfare benefits  starting from  1983 on).
7  Before 1993-94, the welfare benefit 
levels were relatively constant at approximately 6 percent, but between 1992 and 1994 , 
they rose to more than 8 percent and remained high until the late 1990s. The shaded 
areas in the figure show when the older (dark gray) and the younger (light gray) siblings 
are 17–19 years old, which is the age when the younger siblings are potentially exposed 
to  parental  welfare  benefits.  The  circles  denote  the  years  in  which  the  outcome  is 
                                                 
4 We include only children who live with their mother at age 17 and who do not live with their parents at age 24. 
5 Twins and other siblings that are born during the same year are excluded from the sample. 
6 The fact that the first year of the data set is 1990  means that the first year we observe the family 
characteristics is when the children in cohorts 1981–83 are 7–9 years old, and when the children in 
cohorts 1973–75 are 15–17. How this might affect the results is discussed in section 3. 
7 The aggregate welfare benefit rate in Figure 1 includes economic support to recent immigrants. Recent immigrants 
are however excluded from the regression analysis of the paper.  
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measured for the three cohorts of older (dark gray) and younger (light gray) siblings. It 
is worth pointing out that the outcome of the older sibling is always measured one year 
before the start of the younger sibling’s exposure to parental welfare receipt to ensure 
that the outcome of the older control cohorts is not directly affected by the welfare 
benefit receipt of their parents.  
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Figure 1 Unemployment and welfare benefit rates
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Source: The National Labor Market Board (AMS) and Statistics Sweden (SCB). 
The variables that are included in the regression analysis are summarized in Table 1. All 
monetary variables have been deflated to year 2005’s price level. Table 1 contains the 
average values of the main variables by welfare status of the families. We can see that 
both young and old siblings from families that have received welfare are more likely to 
receive welfare as adults. Welfare benefit receipt is also more common if the parents in 
these families are born outside of Sweden, have lower education, are not employed and 
have received sickness benefits. Finally, we observe that old siblings are generally more 
likely to receive welfare benefits than young siblings, which is a fact that probably 
mirrors the tougher labor market situation facing the adult older siblings (see Figure 1). 
                                                 
8 Welfare benefit rates refers to the share of individuals all ages that live in households that received welfare benefits 
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Table 1 Family characteristics of the sibling sample, by welfare status 
  Families with welfare  Families without welfare 








Indicators of welfare benefit status:         
Child welfare at 24  0.140  0.246  0.028  0.061 
Parental welfare during ages 17–19  0.974  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental welfare share of years 17–19  0.466  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Parental welfare/ year 17–19  6,885  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Household characteristics during childhood:         
Divorce during ages 17–19  0.057  0.079  0.031  0.028 
Single mother share of years 17–19  0.364  0.171  0.131  0.068 
Disposable family income total 17–19 (1000 
SEK)  630  975  746  1065 
Sickness benefits mother share of years 17–19  0.264  0.457  0.195  0.337 
Sickness benefits father share of years 17–19  0.136  0.407  0.121  0.282 
Sickness pension mother share of years 17–19  0.174  0.080  0.070  0.021 
Sickness pension father share of years 17–19  0.114  0.058  0.046  0.014 
Disability pension mother share of years 17–19  0.016  0.005  0.005  0.003 
Disability pension father share of years 17–19  0.003  0.000  0.004  0.003 
Mother not employed share of years 17–19  0.316  0.211  0.105  0.102 
Father not employed share of years 17–19  0.242  0.134  0.082  0.068 
Parental characteristics:         
Age of mother at child’s birth  31.280  23.314  32.048  24.152 
Mother’s age at immigration ( =0 if native)  2.238  2.377  0.942  0.670 
Father’s age at immigration  ( =0 if native)  3.347  2.356  1.223  0.786 
Mother born in Sweden  0.902  0.885  0.959  0.960 
Mother born in Nordic country  0.041  0.042  0.029  0.028 
Mother born in Western country  0.005  0.005  0.004  0.004 
Mother born in East Europe  0.010  0.010  0.003  0.003 
Mother born outside Europe/Western country  0.041  0.058  0.005  0.005 
Father born in Sweden  0.881  0.880  0.957  0.956 
Father born in Nordic country  0.052  0.031  0.020  0.021 
Father born in Western country  0.010  0.021  0.008  0.010 
Father born in East Europe  0.010  0.005  0.007  0.007 
Father born outside Europe/Western country  0.047  0.063  0.007  0.007 
Mother finished primary school at age 19 of the 
child  0.264  0.340  0.165  0.189 
Mother finished high school at age 19 of the child  0.523  0.461  0.498  0.496 
Mother finished college at age 19 of the child  0.212  0.199  0.336  0.316 
Father finished primary school at age 19 of the  0.321  0.366  0.263  0.285  
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  Families with welfare  Families without welfare 









Father finished high school at age 19 of the child  0.466  0.429  0.429  0.419 
Father finished college at age 19 of the child  0.212  0.204  0.308  0.296 
Children in the household at age 19 of the child  0.409  2.199  0.259  1.836 
Local characteristics at age 24 of the child:         
Local unemployment  3.893  6.057  3.715  5.641 
Observations  193  191  4588  4825 
As shown in the Table 1, we use several measures of parental benefit receipt. First, a 
dummy variable, Parental Welfare 17–19, indicates whether the parent received welfare 
benefit at any time as the child grew up, defined as when the child is 17–19 years old. 
Second, we generate variables for the share of years during ages 17–19 that the parents 
received welfare benefits, Parental welfare share of years 17–19, as well as for the 
average yearly amount of benefits paid out during this period, Parental welfare/year. To 
measure the welfare use of the children as young adults, we generate a dummy variable, 
which equals one if the child received any welfare benefits at the age of 24.  
Table 1 also shows the large number of family level characteristics measured as the 
child grows up (age 17–19), which will be used in the analysis. These include variables 
measuring the following: whether the parents got divorced during this period, Divorce 
17–19; the share of years the household was a single parent household, Single mother 
share yrs 17–19; the number of children ages 0–17 in the household measured as the 
child is 19, Nr children 0-17 at age 19; the age of the mother as the child is born, Age of 
mother at child’s birth; a set of dummy variables measuring the parents’ education 
levels as the child is 19; and their region of birth. Furthermore, we include measures of 
the share of years, measured as the child is 17–19, that the parents received sickness 
benefits and disability pension, respectively, and we include measures of the share of 
years the parents were outside employment. Family disposable income will be included 
in some of the regression specifications
9, and we include the unemployment rate in the 
municipality where the child resides at age 24. 
                                                 
9 It can be discussed whether the income level should be controlled for, since being low income household is an 
inherent part of being a welfare recipient. This will be discussed further in section 4.  
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3  Empirical methodology 
This section describes the details of the empirical specification. As a starting point, we 













im S  measures the welfare benefit use of child i, living municipality m, as a young 
adult. The explanatory variable of interest is 
P
i S , which measures the welfare benefits 
of the parents as the child grows up.
11 
P
i Z  denotes a set of other parental and family 
variables as the child grows up;  m U  is the unemployment rate in the municipality of 
residence of the adult child; and  im   is a random error term. 
While  correlations  resulting  from  a  regression  model,  such  as  equation  (1),  are 
certainly interesting in themselves, they may not, as previously discussed, reveal the 
causality  of  the  effects.  Is  an  observed  correlation  between  parental  welfare 
participation and the child’s outcome really the effect of the welfare participation, or is 
it  due  to  some  omitted  family  characteristic,  or  to  similarities  between  parents  and 
children, which are also correlated with welfare use?  
To control for unobserved family heterogeneity, we turn to the sibling difference 
analysis. Because this method uses within-family variation, i.e., variation in exposure to 
parental welfare benefit receipt between siblings in the same family, it will in effect 
control for the influence of all family level heterogeneity that is fixed over time. The 
household level covariates will hence now only enter in the regression to the extent that 
they change over time. Estimating the sibling difference equation amounts to adding a 
family fixed effect,  j  , as well as a time cohort effect
12,  i T , to equation (1): 






ijm U T Z S S               (2) 
Under the assumption that all unobserved family heterogeneity that is correlated with 
parental welfare benefit receipt and the outcome variable is captured by the inclusion of 
                                                 
10 We use a linear probability model in this paper but all regressions have also been estimated by a probit model, 
which gives a similar result. The results from these regressions are available upon request. 
11 Only two parent and single mother households are included in the analysis.  
12 This captures differences in the outcomes of the  young and the old siblings that are due to the fact that the 
outcomes for  the  old  and  young  siblings are  measured  at  different  points  in  time,  with  different  labour  market 
opportunities etc.  
  13 
the family fixed effects, the   -coefficient in equation (2) will capture the causal effects 
of being exposed to parental welfare benefit receipt. Therefore, the crucial assumption 
for our method to work is that there are no trends in unobservable factors, which affect 
the children’s future welfare benefit receipt and differ systematically between families 
with and without welfare benefits. To make this assumption more plausible, we allow 
for the time effect, Ti, to differ with respect to a set of predetermined household level 
factors that are likely to be correlated with the welfare benefit propensity of parents.
13 In 
this manner, we control for heterogeneous time trends between groups that are likely to 
differ in terms of the risk of receiving welfare benefits. In addition, we allow for the 
effect of local unemployment measured when the child is 24, to differ between children 
from the two family types; one type in which the parents do not receive welfare benefits 
when any of the siblings are 17 –19 years, and the other in which the parents receive 
welfare  benefits  as  the  younger,  but  not  the  older,  child  is  17–19.  The  resulting 
estimating equation is: 






ijm B U U W T T Z S S                     (3), 
where  Wj  is  a  set  of  predetermined  household  levels  characteristics  that  tend  to  be 
correlated with welfare benefit receipt
14, and Bj equals one if the parents receive welfare 
benefits as the younger sibling is a 17–19 years old, and is zero otherwise.   
Before we turn to the estimation of the regression equations, it is illuminating to 
discuss in more detail the sources of bias that could potentially affect the result. For this 
purpose, we first note that the   -coefficient in equation (2) can be rewritten as the 
expected difference in the differences in adult welfare use between young siblings 
C
y S  
and old  siblings 
C
o S , in  families  that differ in  whether the parents  received welfare 
benefits as the younger sibling was a teenager or not, 
P
y S =1 or 
P
y S =0. This expression 
is shown in equation (4), where for simplicity, we have omitted all other covariates: 
 
                                                 
13 These are the following: Mother born in Nordic country, mother born in Western country, mother born in East 
European country, mother born in other country, father born in Nordic country, father born in Western country, father 
born  in  East  European  country,  father  born  in  other  country,  indicators  for  whether  the  father  or  mother  were 
unemployed at any time during 1985-1990, indicators for  the education level of the father and mother (primary 
school, high school and college) and an indicator for the mother being single any time during 1985-1990. 
14 Note that Wj is a subset of the variables in Zij, for which we have access to predetermined information either in the 
form of information from previous years (1985–90), or in the form of variables that are constant over time, such as 
country of birth.  
14   












y S S S S S S E    (4) 
 
 
Equation (4) is useful to have in mind as we discuss the different types of bias that may 
affect the results. 
First, the fact that the data start in 1990 means that we lack information on the early 
childhood of the siblings – for the older siblings for the period up until they were 14–16 
years old, and for the younger siblings until they were 6–8 years old. However, we do 
have information on a set of economic and demographic variables that are correlated 
with welfare benefit receipt for 1985–89, and we use these variables to predict welfare 
benefit receipt for these years.
15 According to our predictions, none of the households in 
our sibling-sample received welfare benefits during 1985-89, which is reassuring.  
We still, however, lack information until 1984, when the older siblings were 9 –11 
years old. How might this affect the results? To the extent that the children from the 
different types of families in our sample, in which parents either received or did not 
receive  welfare  benefits  as  the  younger  sibling  was  17–19  years  old,  were  equally 
exposed to previous parental welfare spells, the   -coefficient in equation (4) remains 
unbiased. However, if previous welfare spells differ systematically across families, this 
might  affect  the  results.  Perhaps  the  most  likely  case  to  consider  is  one  in  which 
parental  welfare  participation  during  the  unobserved  period  was  more  common  in 
families in which the parents also received welfare benefits as the younger sibling was a 
teenager, i.e., where 
P
y S  =1. This would give rise to a bias towards zero because now 
not  only  the  young  sibling,  but  also  the  older  sibling,  would  to  some  extent  have 
experienced, and been affected by, parental welfare receipt as a child. The fact that we 
do not observe the early childhood of the older siblings is therefore likely to understate 
the effect of parental welfare use on child welfare use. 
Another scenario that could give rise to bias towards zero is the potential existence of 
a latent variable, which affects the welfare benefit receipt of both parents and children, 
but where the timing is such that it first affects welfare receipt of the older siblings, and 
then affects the welfare receipt of the parents. In such a situation, the welfare benefit of 
                                                 
15 Specifically, we use the following variables to predict the probability to use welfare benefits during the year: 
employment status, work-related annual incomes,  local unemployment conditions, education level and type, and 
region of birth, and we use the estimated coefficients from 1991 to for the predictions. The predictions for this year 
correctly predict welfare benefit receipt in 86 percent of cases.  
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parents  and  older  siblings  would  be  positively  correlated,  and  we  would  again  risk 
understating the effect of parental welfare benefit receipt.  
A third issue to keep in mind when interpreting the results is that by construction, the 
sibling sample will not include the most severe cases of parental welfare benefit receipt, 
i.e., those in which parents receive welfare benefits year after year. This is because, as 
described in the previous section, the sibling sample only includes families that received 
no welfare benefits until the older sibling was 24 years old and the younger sibling was 
16 years old. The effect that is captured by estimating our DID-specification is hence 
the effect of being exposed to parental welfare benefits in the late teenage years but not 
before that. Because the larger share of welfare caseloads are in fact made up of shorter 
spells
16, this is an interesting group to study. It is however important to keep in m ind 
that the results may be different in families that are dependent on welfare benefits over 
longer periods of time. 
4  Descriptive analysis 
Before the estimation of the sibling-based DID-analysis of the causal intergenerational 
effects, we will start by providing a detailed description of the intergenerational pattern 
of welfare benefit receipt, using data on all individuals born in years 1981–83 and their 
parents. This means that we use the full cohorts born in the same years as the younger 
siblings  of  the  sibling  analysis.  For  these  cohorts,  we  observe  a  large  number  of 
household level socio-economic factors starting from age 9.  
The reason for starting off with a descriptive section is partly that we think that the 
intergenerational  correlations  that  are  estimated  using  our  large  set  of  data  and 
covariates  are  interesting  in  themselves  and  partly  that  they  can  be  useful  for 
comparison with other studies.  
A first look at the raw data reveals that children’s welfare use is much higher if their 
parents  received welfare benefits  as  the child  grew up:  15.0 percent  of all children 
whose parents received welfare at any point while the child was 9–19 years of age, 
received welfare themselves at the age of 24, compared to 2.8 percent in families in 
which the parents received no welfare. The risk that the child received welfare benefits 
                                                 
16 Dahlberg et al. (2008) show that only a small share of the total welfare case load is made up by individuals who 
remain on welfare year after year.  
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at age 24 further increases with the share of years that the parents received welfare 
benefits: among children whose parents received welfare during up to half of the years 
during the period, approximately 14 percent received welfare themselves at  age 24, 
while  among  those  whose  parents  received  welfare  more  than  three  quarters  of  the 
years, the share of welfare benefit recipients is almost the double, 26 percent.  
This correlation can, however, stem either from the welfare use itself or from other 
factors. Table 2 therefore shows the results from estimating the regression equation (1), 
where we condition on our observable background information on cohorts 1981–83. 
The results in Table 2 show how welfare benefit receipt at the age of 24 correlates with 
exposure to parental welfare participation when the child is 9–19 years old, which is 
defined in column (1), as a dummy for whether the household received welfare benefits 
at  any  point  in  time  during  this  period;  in  column  (2),  as  the  share  of  years  the 
household  received  welfare;  and,  in  column  (3),  as  the  average  annual  amount  of 
welfare  received  during  the  period.  The  dependent  variable,  child  welfare  use  as  a 
young adult, is defined as a dummy that equals one if the household received welfare 
benefits at the age of 24.
17  
The  regressions  in  Table  2  contain a large set of household -level and parental 
background covariates, as well as the municipal unemployment rate facing the child as 
an adult.
18 Table 2 only shows the results for the variable of main interest, parental 
welfare, but the full results can be found in the appendix, Table A 1.  
   
                                                 
17 Note that only children who no longer live with their parents at age 24 are included in the sample. 
18 Household disposable income is included in the set of household level variables in the specification of column (2). 
Whether or not this variable should be included can be discussed, since having a lower income can be seen as an 
inherent part of being a recipient of welfare. We have chosen to include the variable since we want to isolate the role-
model-; net-work-; and attitude-related effects of exposure to parental welfare benefits. It should however be pointed 
out that excluding disposable income from the regressions does not affect the results for parental welfare benefit 
receipt.  
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Table 2 LPM for parental welfare use and child welfare use 
  Child welfare dummy variable at age 24 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Parental welfare dummy 9–19 
0.066***     
(0.002)     
Parental welfare share of years 9–19 
  0.201***   
  (0.006)   
Parental welfare/year 9–19 (1000 SEK) 
    0.00155*** 
    (0.000) 
Household level covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipality fixed effects
¤  No  No  Yes 
Observations  182,200  182,200  182,200 
R-squared  0.064  0.072  0.065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels respectively. 
¤ Municipality fixed effects are included in the regression using the average yearly amount of welfare 
benefits received as the child is 9–19, to control for the fact that cost of living, especially housing, differs 
between municipalities. This affects the amounts of welfare benefits granted. 
The  results  in  Table  3  suggest  that  parental  welfare  benefit  receipt  is  positively 
correlated  with  children’s  welfare  use  as  young  adults  after  we  control  for  a  large 
number of household level characteristics and the local unemployment rate measured at 
age  24  of  the  child.  The  coefficient  in  column  (1)  indicates  that  growing  up  in  a 
household that receives welfare benefits at any point during ages 9–19, is correlated 
with a 6.6 percentage point increase in the probability to receive welfare as a young 
adult; in addition, the coefficient in column (2) suggests that an increase in the share of 
the years that the parents received welfare benefits while the child was 9–19 from zero 
to 100 percent, is correlated with a 20 percentage point increase in the same probability. 
The coefficient in column (3) indicates that a 1000 SEK increase in parent’s annual 
average welfare benefit is correlated with less than a 0.002 percentage point increase in 
the welfare probability of the child as an adult.  
Table 3 shows the results for the same regression specification as in Table 2 but 
shows the estimated coefficients for parental welfare receipt when the child was 9–12 
years, 13–16 years and 17–19 years separately. This is interesting both as an indication 
of at which age the intergenerational correlation is the strongest, and as an indication of 
whether using exposure to parental welfare benefits in the late teens, as we do in the  
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sibling-analysis, is reasonable. (The results for the full set of covariates can be found in 
Table A 2, in the appendix.) 
Table 3 LPM for parental welfare at different ages and child welfare use 
  Child welfare dummy variable at age 24 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Parental welfare 9–12  0.030***     
(0.003)     
       
Parental welfare 13–16 
0.028***     
(0.003)     
Parental welfare 17–19 
0.091***     
(0.004)     
Parental welfare share of 
years 9–12 
  0.057***   
  (0.006)   
Parental welfare share of  
years 13–16 
  0.042***   
  (0.006)   
Parental welfare share of  
years 17–19 
  0.135***   
  (0.007)   
Parental welfare/year 9–12 
(1000 SEK) 
    0.001*** 
    (0.000) 
Parental welfare/year 13–16 
(1000 SEK) 
    0.000 
    (0.000) 
Parental welfare/year 17–19 
(1000 SEK) 
    0.002*** 
    (0.000) 
Household level covariates  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Municipal fixed effects
¤  No  No  Yes 
Observations  175,861  175,861  175,861 
R-squared  0.071  0.072  0.069 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively
. 
¤ Municipality fixed effects are included in the regression using the average yearly amount of welfare benefits, to 
control for the fact that cost of living, especially housing, differs between municipalities. This affects the amounts of 
welfare benefits granted. 
As shown in Table 3, the correlation between parental and child welfare participation is 
the strongest if the parents received welfare benefits when the child was a teenager: the 
coefficients  in  all  specifications  are  statistically  significantly  larger  for  exposure  to 
parental welfare when the child is 17–19 years old compared with the younger age 
intervals. The estimated coefficients in column (1) suggest that parental welfare benefits  
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is correlated with a 9 percentage point increase in the probability that the child received 
welfare benefits at age 24 if measured when the child is 17–19 years old, compared to 
an  approximately  3  percentage  point  increase  when  the  child  is  13–16,  and  9–12, 
respectively. A similar pattern is given for the alternative measures in column (2) and 
(3). The stronger correlation in the late teens might be due to for example role-model or 
net-work related effects being particularly strong at these formative years. 
Therefore, our descriptive analysis shows that even after conditioning on a large set 
of household-level covariates, there is a strong positive intergenerational correlation in 
welfare  benefit  receipt  in  our  data.  We  have  also  observed  that  this  correlation  is 
stronger  for  parental  welfare  spells  that  occur  during  the  late  teenage  years  of  the 
children. Taken together, this suggests that it is interesting to study the causal effects of 
parental welfare receipt, especially during the late teens, which is what we will do in the 
sibling-analysis in the following section.  
5  Estimating the causal effects using a sibling comparison 
approach 
To test whether the positive correlations that were estimated in the previous section in 
fact reflect a causal relationship between parental and child welfare benefit receipt, we 
turn to the estimation of the sibling DID-regression in equations (2)–(3). The results are 
presented in Table 4. The specification in column (1) includes only family fixed effects 
and a dummy variable for being a young sibling, in addition to the main explanatory 
variable. In column 2, we include parental characteristics, local unemployment and the 
interaction between coming from a welfare receiving family and local unemployment. 
In column 3, we exclude the interaction with local unemployment but instead include an 
interaction  between  a  set  of  predetermined  parental  background  characteristics
19 
correlated with welfare benefit use and the time dummy variable ( i.e., if the sibling is 
young).  Finally,  column  4  combines  all  covariates  from  column  2  and  3.  This 
specification corresponds to equation (3). 
For comparison, we have added an additional column (column 5), which contains the 
results obtained when we run the OLS correlation regression of equation (1) using only 
                                                 
19 Parents’ country of birth, indicators for whether the father or mother were unemployed at any time 
during 1985-1990, indicators for the education level of the father and mother (primary school, high school 
and college) and an indicator for the mother being single any time during 1985-1990.  
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the sample of younger siblings that are included in the sibling analysis.
20 As shown in 
column 5, these results are fairly similar to the results obtained when we used the entire 
cohorts in Table 3 and Table 4.
21 
The coefficients for the three different measures of parental welfare benefit receipt 
during ages 17-19 are shown in panels A–C; parental welfare at any time is shown in 
panel A; share of years with welfare in panel B; and the amount of welfare benefits in 
panel C. (The results for the full set of covariates can be found in Table A 3, Table A 4, 
and Table A 5 in the Appendix.)  
                                                 
20 Note that the older siblings are not included in this regression, since the parents’ welfare receipt is zero for all of 
the older siblings and there is hence no identifying variation among them to use to identify effects of parental welfare 
benefits. In the sibling-DID they are however needed as an untreated control group. 
21 The full set of results for the correlations in column 5 can be obtained from the authors upon request.   
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Table 4 Sibling fixed effects model for parental welfare and child welfare use at the age 
of 24 
  Child welfare at 24 
  Sibling fixed effects model  Correlation young 
siblings 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Explanatory variable A:           
Parental welfare during ages 17-
19 
-0.061  -0.025  -0.048  -0.016  0.094** 
(0.037)  (0.060)  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.026) 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.04 
           
Explanatory variable B:           
Parental welfare share of years 
17-19 
-0.144  -0.113  -0.124  -0.101  0.179** 
(0.077)  (0.105)  (0.076)  (0.106)  (0.052) 
R-squared  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.04 
Explanatory variable C:           
Parental welfare/year 17-19 
(1000 SEK) 
0.001  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.007** 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
R-squared  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.09 
           
Dummy variable young sibling  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
Family fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  - 
Household level covariates and 
local unemployment at age 24 
No  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
† 
Interactions household 
characteristics*young  No  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Interaction local 
unemployment*welfare family  No  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Observations  9797  9797  9797  9797  4781 
Number of groups  4615  4615  4615  4615   
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels 
respectively
.. All regressions with parental welfare/year as explanatory variable include municipal fixed effects at age 
19. 
† The household level covariates in column (5) also include the time invariant variables that are naturally excluded in 
the fixed effects analysis. 
As shown in column (1) in Table 4, the effect of parental welfare becomes negative and 
insignificant  for  parental  welfare  measures  A  and  B,  and  becomes  positive  and 
insignificant for measure C, as we control for unobserved family level heterogeneity by 
including sibling fixed effects in the regressions. For the two former measures, A and B, 
of parental welfare, the coefficient size further decreases as we add additional covariates 
to  the  regression,  in  specifications  (2)–(4).  For  the  third  measure,  average  yearly 
amounts of parental welfare benefits, the coefficient is instead larger when additional  
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covariates are included but is also always insignificant. The coefficient of our preferred 
specification in column 4, using the parental welfare dummy variable in panel A, is 
fairly close to zero but is imprecisely estimated.
22 
Among the control variables (displayed in Appendix A), we find that the age of the 
father at immigration has a significant positive effect on the risk of recei ving welfare 
benefits as an adult. The local unemployment rate also seems to be an important factor: 
a one percentage point increase in the local unemployment level is associated with 7 -9 
percent increase in the probability of receiving welfare. Finally, on average, the younger 
siblings have a 3.5-3.8 percentage point lower risk of using welfare benefits as an adult, 
which is consistent with the general decreasing trend in welfare benefit levels during the 
first half of the 2000s, as was indicated in Figure 1. 
The overall picture that emerges from the sibling analysis is hence that including a 
family fixed effect in welfare use eliminates the positive correlation between children’s 
and parents’ welfare benefit receipt that was found in the initial correlation analysis. As 
suggested by our use of predicted values for welfare benefit receipt for the period 1985–
89, this result does not seem to be driven by a negative bias due to unobserved early 
welfare use.  
The results suggest that the large and positive intergenerational correlation in welfare 
benefit receipt that was observed in the descriptive analysis, especially when parents 
received welfare benefits in the child’s late teens, was not due to the welfare benefit 
receipt per se, but rather to unobservable factors correlated with welfare benefit receipt. 
It is interesting to note that this is consistent with the findings of Stenberg (2000), who 
reports evidence of positive intergenerational correlations in welfare benefit receipt only 
when other social problems that are usually not observable to the researcher, such as 
behavioral problems in school or having a father with a criminal record, were present. 
There  are,  however,  a  couple  of  potential  alternative  explanations  for  the 
insignificant results of the sibling analysis that should be noted.  
                                                 
22 It can be noted that the estimations in Table 5 were calculated using only families for which we do have 
information on the set of predetermined variables, observed in 1985–90, which are used to create the time 
trends in estimations column (3) and (4). When we rerun the regressions in column (1) and (2) using the 
full sample of siblings, we find that the point estimate of specification (1) goes from being marginally 
insignificant and negative, to being significant and negative, while the point estimate of specification (2) 
is negative and insignificant, as in Table 6. The major difference between the two samples is that the 
sample used in the main analysis does not include families in which the father and/or mother immigrated 
later than 1985.  
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First, as discussed in section 3, the estimates in Table 4 are identified using only the 
families in which the parents did not receive welfare benefits until the younger sibling 
turned 17. The results shall hence be interpreted as the effects of temporary parental 
welfare  spells  when  the  children  are  in  their  late  teens,  on  children’s  welfare 
participation.  We  cannot  rule  out  that  the  effects  are  different  for  longer  spells  of 
parental  welfare  benefit  receipt,  or  that  the  effect  might  be  different  for  younger 
children. 
Second, as also noted in section 3, the welfare benefit receipt of both the parents and 
the older siblings could be correlated with some latent variable that affects the welfare 
benefit receipt among the older siblings before it affects that of the parents. This would 
lead to the coefficient being biased towards zero. 
Third,  our  sample  size  is  admittedly  small;  when  restricting  the  sample  to  only 
include siblings that meet the requirement for our sibling-based analysis, we are left 
with 180 families that received welfare. We cannot therefore rule out that the results 
reflect a lack of variation in our sample. However, the cross-sectional OLS-results in 
column (5) of Table 4 are statistically significant and are also similar in size to the 
estimates in the analysis using the full 1981-1983 cohorts in section 4, so the sibling 
sample is at least rich enough to detect the same correlation pattern as when using the 
full data set.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that our results are similar to the results in Ekhaugen 
(2009), who finds positive correlations in unemployment between parents and children 
when  not  accounting  for  unobserved  family  heterogeneity  but  negative,  albeit 
insignificant, effects as sibling-fixed effects are included.    
6  Conclusions 
To conclude, the results of our study suggest that children who grow up in households 
in which the parents received welfare benefits are themselves more likely to receive 
welfare benefits.  This  correlation  increases  with  the period spent on welfare by the 
parents and is present also when we control for a number of household socio-economic 
controls. Using the sibling comparison approach to identify causal effects, we cannot, 
however, refute the zero hypothesis of no relationship between parental welfare use and 
child  welfare  participation.  This  suggests  that  the  positive  relationship  found  in  the  
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descriptive analysis was driven by other factors than by welfare use per se. These results 
are consistent with the previous literature on welfare benefit transmission, which has 
generally  found  no  or  weakly  positive  evidence  of  causal  intergenerational  welfare 
benefit transmission. 
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Appendix A: Supplementary descriptive statistics and estimates 
Table A 1 LPM for parental welfare use and child welfare use 
  Child welfare at 24 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3) 
       
Parental welfare during ages 9-19  0.0655***     
  (0.00188)     
Parental welfare share of years ages 9-19    0.201***   
    (0.00552)   
Parental welfare yearly amount ages 9-19      0.00155*** 
      (8.66e-05) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 9-19  0.0356***  0.0374***  0.0540*** 
  (0.00299)  (0.00297)  (0.00300) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 9-19  -0.00343  0.00842*  0.00369 
  (0.00450)  (0.00447)  (0.00451) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 9-19  0.00648  0.00909  0.00427 
  (0.0109)  (0.0108)  (0.0108) 
Sickness benefits father share of  years 9-19  0.0264***  0.0318***  0.0392*** 
  (0.00339)  (0.00337)  (0.00340) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 9-19  0.00459  0.0149***  0.0130** 
  (0.00559)  (0.00555)  (0.00560) 
Disability pension father share of  years 9-19  -0.00713  -0.00849  -0.00645 
  (0.0107)  (0.0105)  (0.0106) 
Mother not employed share of  years 9-19  0.0522***  0.0262***  0.0559*** 
  (0.00287)  (0.00285)  (0.00288) 
Father not employed share of  years 9-19  0.0543***  0.0343***  0.0499*** 
  (0.00352)  (0.00355)  (0.00357) 
Mother finished high school at age 19  -0.0124***  -0.00814***  -0.0111*** 
  (0.00174)  (0.00173)  (0.00174) 
Mother finished college at age 19  -0.0143***  -0.0106***  -0.0161*** 
  (0.00181)  (0.00180)  (0.00182) 
Father finished high school at age 19  0.00152  0.00198  0.000900 
  (0.00139)  (0.00138)  (0.00140) 
Father finished college at age 19  -0.000464  -0.00107  -0.00339** 
  (0.00150)  (0.00149)  (0.00153) 
Disposable family income total 9-19  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
-3.15e-10***  -4.04e-10***  -1.76e-07* 
  (1.03e-10)  (1.15e-10)  (1.01e-07)  
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  Child welfare at 24 
VARIABLES  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Single mother share of  years 9–19  0.0319***  0.0283***  0.0465*** 
  (0.00232)  (0.00230)  (0.00231) 
Divorce during ages 9–19  0.0107***  0.0124***  0.0162*** 
  (0.00193)  (0.00192)  (0.00193) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 19  0.00342***  0.00169**  0.00266*** 
  (0.000736)  (0.000732)  (0.000736) 
Mother born in Nordic country  0.00494  0.0114***  0.0107*** 
  (0.00354)  (0.00353)  (0.00358) 
Mother born in Western country  -0.00330  0.00523  0.00291 
  (0.00603)  (0.00596)  (0.00601) 
Mother born in East Europe  -0.00620  -0.00795  -0.00864 
  (0.00619)  (0.00616)  (0.00620) 
Mother born outside Europe/Western country  -0.000939  -0.00801  -0.00650 
  (0.00678)  (0.00676)  (0.00681) 
Father born in Nordic country  0.00531  0.0128***  0.0127*** 
  (0.00379)  (0.00378)  (0.00381) 
Father born in Western country  -0.00508  0.00476  0.00320 
  (0.00496)  (0.00495)  (0.00498) 
Father born in East Europe  -0.0147**  -0.0170***  -0.0147** 
  (0.00611)  (0.00608)  (0.00611) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country  -0.00680  -0.00302  0.00233 
  (0.00636)  (0.00634)  (0.00638) 
Mother’s age at child’s birth  -0.00100***  -0.00102***  -0.00114*** 
  (0.000134)  (0.000134)  (0.000135) 
Mother’s age at immigration  -8.64e-05  -0.000372**  -0.000218 
  (0.000145)  (0.000144)  (0.000146) 
Father’s age at immigration  0.000271**  -8.77e-05  4.26e-06 
  (0.000130)  (0.000130)  (0.000131) 
Local unemployment at age 24 of child  0.00106***  0.00104***  0.000395 
  (0.000278)  (0.000277)  (0.000280) 
Constant  0.0357***  0.0397***  0.0577*** 
  (0.00453)  (0.00451)  (0.0104) 
Municipality fixed effects   No  No  Yes 
Observations  182,200  182,200  182,200 
R-squared  0.064  0.072  0.065 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
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Table A 2 LPM for parental welfare use and child welfare use different ages 
VARIABLES  Child welfare at 24 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Parental welfare during ages 9-12  0.0302***     
  (0.00263)     
Parental welfare during ages 13-16  0.0284***     
  (0.00273)     
Parental welfare during ages 17-19  0.0905***     
  (0.00360)     
Parental welfare share of years ages 9-12    0.0574***   
    (0.00552)   
Parental welfare share of years ages 13-16    0.0422***   
    (0.00598)   
Parental welfare share of years ages 17-19    0.135***   
    (0.00668)   
Parental welfare yearly amount ages 9-12      0.000710*** 
      (0.000133) 
Parental welfare yearly amount ages 13-16      0.000214 
      (0.000152) 
Parental welfare yearly amount ages 17-19      0.00198*** 
      (0.000204) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 9-12  0.0125***  0.0143***  0.0196*** 
  (0.00217)  (0.00217)  (0.00218) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 13-16  0.00678**  0.00799***  0.0162*** 
  (0.00302)  (0.00302)  (0.00303) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 17-19  0.0111***  0.0124***  0.0172*** 
  (0.00208)  (0.00208)  (0.00209) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 9-12  0.00410  0.00913  0.00803 
  (0.00845)  (0.00843)  (0.00850) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 13-16  -0.00423  -0.00227  -0.00255 
  (0.00850)  (0.00849)  (0.00855) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 17-19  0.00288  0.00299  0.00269 
  (0.00550)  (0.00550)  (0.00551) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 9-12  0.0404  0.0412  0.0396 
  (0.0266)  (0.0267)  (0.0267) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 13-16  0.00403  0.00132  -0.00166 
  (0.0340)  (0.0340)  (0.0341) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 17-19  -0.0258  -0.0236  -0.0244  
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VARIABLES  Child welfare at 24 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  (0.0199)  (0.0200)  (0.0199) 
Sickness benefits father  share of  years 9-12  0.0147***  0.0162***  0.0192*** 
  (0.00231)  (0.00231)  (0.00231) 
Sickness benefits father  share of  years 13-16  0.00446  0.00544  0.00924*** 
  (0.00346)  (0.00346)  (0.00348) 
Sickness benefits father  share of  years 17-19  0.00762***  0.00830***  0.00952*** 
  (0.00256)  (0.00256)  (0.00257) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 9-12  0.0278***  0.0317***  0.0372*** 
  (0.0103)  (0.0102)  (0.0103) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 13-16  -0.0177*  -0.0166*  -0.0199** 
  (0.0101)  (0.0101)  (0.0101) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 17-19  0.00630  0.00467  0.00509 
  (0.00686)  (0.00685)  (0.00689) 
Disability pension father share of  years 9-12  0.0204  0.0225  0.0239 
  (0.0252)  (0.0252)  (0.0247) 
Disability pension father share of  years 13-16  -0.0549*  -0.0545  -0.0538* 
  (0.0332)  (0.0334)  (0.0324) 
Disability pension father share of  years 17-19  0.0192  0.0175  0.0174 
  (0.0244)  (0.0246)  (0.0239) 
Mother not employed share of  years 9-12  0.0139***  0.0113***  0.0196*** 
  (0.00292)  (0.00292)  (0.00295) 
Mother not employed share of  years 13-16  0.00693**  0.00616*  0.0154*** 
  (0.00332)  (0.00332)  (0.00334) 
Mother not employed share of  years 17-19  0.0140***  0.00948***  0.0168*** 
  (0.00315)  (0.00314)  (0.00314) 
Father not employed share of  years 9-12  0.0123***  0.00995***  0.0151*** 
  (0.00372)  (0.00372)  (0.00373) 
Father not employed share of  years 13-16  0.0153***  0.0153***  0.0200*** 
  (0.00400)  (0.00400)  (0.00400) 
Father not employed share of  years 17-19  0.0133***  0.0120***  0.0139*** 
  (0.00349)  (0.00348)  (0.00349) 
Mother finished high school at age 12 of child  -0.00322  -0.00393  -0.00725 
  (0.00753)  (0.00759)  (0.00754) 
Mother finished college at age 12 of child  0.00250  -0.000481  -0.00174 
  (0.00811)  (0.00817)  (0.00812) 
Mother finished high school at age 16 of child  0.000386  -0.000776  -0.00158  
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VARIABLES  Child welfare at 24 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  (0.00799)  (0.00805)  (0.00801) 
Mother finished college at age 16 of child  -0.00534  -0.00713  -0.00788 
  (0.00941)  (0.00947)  (0.00946) 
Mother finished high school at age 19 of child  -0.00587  -0.00292  -0.00184 
  (0.00392)  (0.00392)  (0.00393) 
Mother finished college at age 19 of child  -0.00748  -0.00266  -0.00580 
  (0.00583)  (0.00584)  (0.00588) 
Father finished high school at age 12 of child  0.0342***  0.0342***  0.0328*** 
  (0.0114)  (0.0115)  (0.0115) 
Father finished college at age 12 of child  0.0172  0.0147  0.0138 
  (0.0130)  (0.0130)  (0.0130) 
Father finished high school at age 16 of child  -0.0305**  -0.0312**  -0.0324*** 
  (0.0124)  (0.0125)  (0.0125) 
Father finished college at age 16 of child  -0.00394  -0.00238  -0.00658 
  (0.0149)  (0.0149)  (0.0149) 
Father finished high school at age 19 of child  -0.000314  0.000423  0.00204 
  (0.00522)  (0.00522)  (0.00518) 
Father finished college at age 19 of child  -0.0122  -0.0118  -0.00907 
  (0.00767)  (0.00765)  (0.00772) 
Disposable family income total 9-12  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
1.72e-10  2.79e-10  1.50e-06** 
  (6.90e-10)  (6.93e-10)  (7.30e-07) 
Disposable family income total 13-16  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
-6.20e-10*  -9.23e-10**  -6.64e-07* 
  (3.47e-10)  (3.78e-10)  (3.49e-07) 
Disposable family income total 17-19  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
-6.51e-07**  -6.73e-07**  -0.000646** 
  (2.76e-07)  (2.99e-07)  (0.000277) 
Single mother share of  years 9–12  0.0181***  0.0193***  0.0271*** 
  (0.00408)  (0.00408)  (0.00407) 
Single mother share of  years 13–16  -0.000125  3.17e-05  0.00449 
  (0.00480)  (0.00479)  (0.00479) 
Single mother share of  years 17–19  0.00685*  0.00595  0.0124*** 
  (0.00403)  (0.00402)  (0.00404) 
Divorce 9-19  0.0110***  0.0136***  0.0180*** 
  (0.00255)  (0.00254)  (0.00256) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 12  -0.00411***  -0.00385***  -0.00106 
  (0.000966)  (0.000962)  (0.000969)  
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VARIABLES  Child welfare at 24 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 16  0.00129  0.000715  6.17e-05 
  (0.00178)  (0.00178)  (0.00179) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 19  0.00244  0.00232  0.00207 
  (0.00172)  (0.00171)  (0.00172) 
Mother born in Nordic country  0.00553  0.00712**  0.00847** 
  (0.00359)  (0.00359)  (0.00364) 
Mother born in Western country  0.00248  0.00421  0.00261 
  (0.00618)  (0.00614)  (0.00620) 
Mother born in East Europe  0.000881  0.000801  -0.000799 
  (0.00630)  (0.00629)  (0.00634) 
Mother born outside Europe/Western country  -0.0110  -0.0167**  -0.0185*** 
  (0.00704)  (0.00705)  (0.00713) 
Father born in Nordic country  0.00597  0.00879**  0.00959** 
  (0.00382)  (0.00382)  (0.00386) 
Father born in Western country  -0.00194  0.00115  0.00184 
  (0.00507)  (0.00507)  (0.00511) 
Father born in East Europe  -0.00727  -0.00538  -0.00458 
  (0.00629)  (0.00628)  (0.00630) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country  -0.00525  -0.00476  3.01e-05 
  (0.00663)  (0.00664)  (0.00669) 
Mother’s age at child’s birth  -0.00107***  -0.00107***  -0.00116*** 
  (0.000137)  (0.000137)  (0.000139) 
Mother’s age at immigration  -0.000155  -0.000189  -0.000163 
  (0.000149)  (0.000148)  (0.000151) 
Father’s age at immigration  0.000245*  0.000142  0.000169 
  (0.000136)  (0.000136)  (0.000137) 
Local unemployment at age 24 of child  0.000524*  0.000595**  0.000200 
  (0.000276)  (0.000276)  (0.000280) 
Constant  0.0454***  0.0468***  0.0620*** 
  (0.00522)  (0.00522)  (0.0109) 
Municipality fixed effects  No  No  Yes 
Observations  175,861  175,861  175,861 
R-squared  0.071  0.072  0.069 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
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Table A 3 Sibling fixed effects model for parental welfare during ages 17-19 and child 
welfare use at the age of 24, siblings born in 1973-75 and 1981-83 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental welfare share of  years 17-19  -0.061  -0.025  -0.048  -0.016 
  (0.037)  (0.060)  (0.037)  (0.060) 
Young  -0.035**  -0.017  -0.017  -0.019 
  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 17-19    0.001  0.000  0.001 
    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 17-19    0.017  0.014  0.014 
    (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 17-19    -0.003  0.006  0.008 
    (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.052) 
Sickness benefits father share of  years 17-19    0.007  0.007  0.007 
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 17–19    0.030  0.030  0.029 
    (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Disability pension father share of  years 17–19    0.103  0.104  0.105 
    (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.077) 
Mother not employed share of  years 17–19    -0.029  -0.032  -0.031 
    (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Father not employed share of  years 17–19    0.005  0.007  0.007 
    (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Mother finished high school at age 19    -0.034  -0.044  -0.043 
    (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Mother finished college at age 19    -0.008  -0.018  -0.017 
    (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Father finished high school at age 19    0.009  0.006  0.006 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Father finished college at age 19    -0.020  -0.023  -0.023 
    (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Disposable family income total 17–19  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Single mother share of  years 17–19    0.016  0.014  0.014 
    (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Divorce during ages 17–19    0.010  0.011  0.011 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 19    0.002  0.001  0.001  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Father born in Nordic country    -0.067  -0.089  -0.089 
    (0.100)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Father born in Western country    -0.003  -0.007  -0.011 
    (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.077) 
Father born in East Europe    0.080  0.058  0.058 
    (0.173)  (0.188)  (0.188) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country    0.327  0.341  0.342 
    (0.235)  (0.231)  (0.231) 
Age of father at immigration    -0.003*  -0.004*  -0.004* 
    (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Average local unemployment    0.007**  0.008**  0.008* 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Local unemployment * welfare family    0.015    0.015 
    (0.024)    (0.024) 
Mother born in Nordic country * young      -0.026  -0.026 
      (0.029)  (0.029) 
Mother born in Western country * young      0.094  0.094 
      (0.049)  (0.049) 
Mother born in East Europe * young      0.035  0.034 
      (0.030)  (0.030) 
Mother born outside Europe/Western country * young      -0.146  -0.146 
      (0.089)  (0.089) 
Father born in Nordic country * young      0.034  0.034 
      (0.044)  (0.044) 
Father born in Western country * young      0.015  0.015 
      (0.048)  (0.048) 
Father born in East Europe * young      0.029  0.029 
      (0.070)  (0.070) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country * young      -0.065  -0.065 
      (0.068)  (0.069) 
Father unemployed during 1985-1990* young      0.014  0.013 
      (0.018)  (0.018) 
Father only primary school in 1985-1990* young      -0.009  -0.008 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Mother only primary school in 1985-1990* young      0.022*  0.022* 
      (0.010)  (0.010)  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Single mother in 1990* young      -0.006  -0.006 
      (0.024)  (0.024) 
Mother unemployed during 1985-1990* young      -0.007  -0.007 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Constant  0.069**  0.040  0.055  0.051 
  (0.002)  (0.036)  (0.164)  (0.164) 
Observations  9797  9797  9797  9797 
Number of groups  4615  4615  4615  4615 
R-squared  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
    
36   
Table A 4 Sibling fixed effects model for parental welfare share of years 17-19 during 
ages 17-19 and child welfare use at the age of 24, siblings born in 1973-75 and 1981-
83 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental welfare share of  years 17-19  -0.144  -0.113  -0.124  -0.101 
  (0.077)  (0.105)  (0.076)  (0.106) 
Young  -0.035**  -0.017  -0.015  -0.016 
  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 17-19    0.001  0.000  0.001 
    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 17-19    0.017  0.014  0.014 
    (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 17-19    0.000  0.010  0.010 
    (0.050)  (0.054)  (0.054) 
Sickness benefits father share of  years 17-19    0.007  0.007  0.007 
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 17–19    0.030  0.028  0.028 
    (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025) 
Disability pension father share of  years 17–19    0.102  0.104  0.104 
    (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.077) 
Mother not employed share of  years 17–19    -0.028  -0.030  -0.030 
    (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
Father not employed share of  years 17–19    0.006  0.008  0.008 
    (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Mother finished high school at age 19    -0.034  -0.044  -0.043 
    (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Mother finished college at age 19    -0.008  -0.017  -0.017 
    (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.044) 
Father finished high school at age 19    0.008  0.005  0.006 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Father finished college at age 19    -0.020  -0.024  -0.023 
    (0.026)  (0.026)  (0.027) 
Disposable family income total 17–19  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Single mother share of  years 17–19    0.018  0.017  0.017 
    (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Divorce during ages 17–19    0.009  0.009  0.009 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022)  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 19    0.002  0.001  0.001 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Father born in Nordic country    -0.065  -0.087  -0.087 
    (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Father born in Western country    -0.001  -0.006  -0.008 
    (0.078)  (0.077)  (0.077) 
Father born in East Europe    0.081  0.060  0.060 
    (0.173)  (0.188)  (0.188) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country    0.332  0.347  0.346 
    (0.238)  (0.233)  (0.232) 
Age of father at immigration    -0.003*  -0.004*  -0.004* 
    (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Average local unemployment    0.008**  0.008**  0.008** 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Local unemployment * welfare family    0.007    0.007 
    (0.020)    (0.020) 
Mother born in Nordic country * young      -0.025  -0.025 
      (0.029)  (0.029) 
Mother born in Western country * young      0.093  0.093 
      (0.049)  (0.049) 
Mother born in East Europe * young      0.039  0.038 
      (0.031)  (0.031) 
Mother born outside Europe/Western country * young      -0.142  -0.142 
      (0.089)  (0.089) 
Father born in Nordic country * young      0.035  0.035 
      (0.044)  (0.044) 
Father born in Western country * young      0.014  0.015 
      (0.048)  (0.048) 
Father born in East Europe * young      0.027  0.027 
      (0.070)  (0.070) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country * young      -0.064  -0.064 
      (0.069)  (0.069) 
Father unemployed during 1985-1990* young      0.015  0.014 
      (0.018)  (0.018) 
Father only primary school in 1985-1990* young      -0.009  -0.008 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Mother only primary school in 1985-1990* young      0.022*  0.022*  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Single mother in 1990* young      -0.004  -0.004 
      (0.024)  (0.024) 
Mother unemployed during 1985-1990* young      -0.006  -0.006 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Constant  0.069**  0.040  0.063  0.061 
  (0.002)  (0.036)  (0.164)  (0.164) 
Observations  9797  9797  9797  9797 
Number of groups  4615  4615  4615  4615 
R-squared  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
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Table A 5 Sibling fixed effects model for parental welfare/year during ages 17-19 and 
child welfare use at the age of 24, siblings born in 1973-75 and 1981-83 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Parental welfare share of  years 17-19  0.001  0.003  0.002  0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Young  -0.038**  -0.023  -0.026  -0.031 
  (0.004)  (0.012)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
Sickness benefits mother  share of  years 17-19    -0.002  -0.003  -0.003 
    (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Sickness pension mother share of  years 17-19    0.008  0.006  0.006 
    (0.024)  (0.024)  (0.024) 
Disability pension mother share of  years 17-19    -0.036  -0.037  -0.036 
    (0.054)  (0.052)  (0.053) 
Sickness benefits father share of  years 17-19    0.010  0.012  0.010 
    (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.013) 
Sickness pension father share of  years 17–19    0.037  0.036  0.036 
    (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027) 
Disability pension father share of  years 17–19    0.084  0.085  0.086 
    (0.081)  (0.083)  (0.082) 
Mother not employed share of  years 17–19    -0.032  -0.038*  -0.035* 
    (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.018) 
Father not employed share of  years 17–19    0.005  0.005  0.006 
    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Mother finished high school at age 19    -0.026  -0.037  -0.034 
    (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Mother finished college at age 19    0.001  -0.011  -0.006 
    (0.045)  (0.045)  (0.045) 
Father finished high school at age 19    0.007  0.005  0.005 
    (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Father finished college at age 19    -0.011  -0.014  -0.014 
    (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.028) 
Disposable family income total 17–19  
(1 000 000’s of SEK) 
  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Single mother share of  years 17–19    0.024  0.018  0.021 
    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019) 
Divorce during ages 17–19    0.013  0.015  0.015 
    (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
Nr children 0-17 in the household at age 19    0.000  0.001  -0.000  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
    (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Father born in Nordic country    -0.039  -0.061  -0.057 
    (0.103)  (0.105)  (0.105) 
Father born in Western country    -0.020  -0.024  -0.031 
    (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.046) 
Father born in East Europe    0.211  0.206  0.207 
    (0.125)  (0.134)  (0.134) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country    0.263  0.274  0.275 
    (0.228)  (0.222)  (0.222) 
Age of father at immigration    -0.003*  -0.003  -0.003 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Average local unemployment    0.007*  0.009**  0.007* 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Local unemployment * welfare family    0.034*    0.032* 
    (0.016)    (0.016) 
Mother born in Nordic country * young      -0.030  -0.031 
      (0.029)  (0.029) 
Mother born in Western country * young      0.091  0.092 
      (0.050)  (0.050) 
Mother born in East Europe * young      0.048  0.051 
      (0.029)  (0.030) 
Mother born outside Europe/Western country * young      -0.169  -0.161 
      (0.097)  (0.096) 
Father born in Nordic country * young      0.030  0.032 
      (0.042)  (0.042) 
Father born in Western country * young      0.022  0.022 
      (0.051)  (0.051) 
Father born in East Europe * young      0.001  0.000 
      (0.068)  (0.068) 
Father born outside Europe/Western country * young      -0.071  -0.070 
      (0.070)  (0.070) 
Father unemployed during 1985-1990* young      0.016  0.015 
      (0.019)  (0.019) 
Father only primary school in 1985-1990* young      -0.010  -0.009 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Mother only primary school in 1985-1990* young      0.021*  0.022* 
      (0.011)  (0.010)  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Single mother in 1990* young      -0.026  -0.021 
      (0.026)  (0.026) 
Mother unemployed during 1985-1990* young      -0.009  -0.007 
      (0.010)  (0.010) 
Constant  0.058  0.038  0.013  0.012 
  (0.146)  (0.149)  (0.215)  (0.216) 
Observations  9797  9797  9797  9797 
Number of groups  4615  4615  4615  4615 
R-squared  0.07  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 